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EQUITABLE  REMEDIES:  PROTECTING
“WHAT  WE  HAVE  COMING  TO  US”
Larissa Katz*
This Article develops a new, doctrinally informed, theoretical account of equitable remedies
in terms of our interest in “what we have coming to us”—an interest beyond private law’s com-
mitment to protecting what is already ours, viz., our property rights and our rights to another’s
performance of a contract.  Through distinctive equitable remedies like specific performance,
injunctions, and the remedial constructive trust, equity intervenes to prevent others from
obstructing or diverting what a person has coming to her.  The need for equity to recognize and to
protect an interest in “what we have coming to us” arises, I argue, out of the limits of private
law: private law allows that ordinary people have powers to change their normative situation to
bring about a planned-for state of affairs and goes so far as to obligate us to exercise those powers
where we have agreed to do so.  But private law, in leaving it to us actually to exercise those
powers, allows for a gap between what we already have and what we have coming to us, a gap
private law lacks the resources to close.  For example, an agreement to sell land still requires the
owner’s exercise of the independent power to convey in order to bring about that planned-for state
of affairs in which the purchaser is the new owner of Blackacre.  This account offers a unified
explanation of equity’s response to this gap in a wide range of legal areas, from contracts (specific
performance, the remedial constructive trust), unfair competition (accounting and injunctions),
property (injunctive relief in a nuisance action) to court actions (interlocutory injunctions, asset
protection).
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INTRODUCTION
The core claim in this Article is that equitable remedies1 of specific per-
formance (and relatedly, injunctions and constructive trusts) are best under-
stood as setting out and protecting distinct equitable rights through what we
might call “negotiable duties.”  I will argue that these equitable remedies can-
not be understood in the same way as legal remedies, as reparations for
wrongs or continuations in remedial form of a preexisting legal right.  On my
account, these equitable remedies enforce a distinct equitable right against
the obstruction, diversion, or expropriation of what we have coming to us—
as parties to an agreement, as neighbors, as competitors—by anyone with
notice of the equitable interest and the power to compromise it.2  A distinc-
tive feature of this kind of right, I will argue, is that, unlike private law rights,
it is protected through negotiable duties—duties that travel from one person
to the next, sometimes to third parties who stand in no preexisting legal rela-
tionship to the complainant and who have not themselves committed any
private law rights violation.
A specifically performable contract is thus a composite of two distinct
rights: the contractual right and an equitable right that extends beyond the
contractual right, both in terms of its content and in terms of its enforceabil-
ity.  An equitable right is free of the confines of contractual privity: it is
enforceable against third parties to the contract who bear the power to com-
promise the protected interest, with notice of it.  One important implication
of this account is that the equitable interests and duties that arise in conjunc-
tion with specific performance need not and often do not track what the
parties actually agreed upon.  Consider specifically enforceable contracts for
the purchase and sale of land, a standard context in which equity intervenes
with a decree of specific performance.3  Where a vendor in an agreement for
1 On the significance of the equitable nature of these remedies, I follow Samuel L.
Bray, Fiduciary Remedies, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 449 (Evan J. Criddle,
Paul B. Miller & Robert H. Sitkoff eds., 2019); Samuel L. Bray, Remedies, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF NEW PRIVATE LAW 563 (Andrew Gold, John C.P. Goldberg, Daniel B. Kelly,
Emily L. Sherwin & Henry E. Smith eds., 2020); Samuel L. Bray, The System of Equitable
Remedies, 63 UCLA L. REV. 530 (2016).
2 Cf. SARAH WORTHINGTON, EQUITY 142–43 (2d ed. 2006) (formulating the general
function of equity as “proscriptive rules” that “operate” so as “to regulate the exercise of all
powers where the claimant’s interests may be compromised by the defendant’s decision”
(emphasis omitted)).
3 This idea is, however, not limited to land. See e.g., Oughtred v. Comm’rs of Inland
Revenue [1959] UKHL 3, [1960] AC 206 (appeal taken from Eng.).  In this case, the
House of Lords found that a contract to transfer the beneficial reversionary interest in
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purchase and sale transfers land before the purchase price is paid, what she
has coming to her is the purchase price.  Now she has an enforceable con-
tractual right to be paid.  But equity gives her something more: a secured
debt.  She has the right to resort to the land itself to realize the purchase
price owing.  The vendor’s equitable lien is not something she bargained for:
she bargained for an in personam duty to perform the contract by paying an
agreed-upon sum, not a lien attached to the land itself.  This equitable right
in the form of a lien also gives the vendor priority in a bankruptcy, which no
contract can pull off.  What the vendor has coming to her—the purchase
price—is now protected against obstruction in the form of breach or diver-
sion to other creditors in a bankruptcy through the vendor’s lien recognized
and enforced in a decree of specific performance.  The same two features of
this kind of equitable right are evident on the buyer’s side, too, in a specifi-
cally enforceable agreement for purchase and sale.  In a decree of specific
performance, equity intervenes to recognize and enforce the buyer’s equita-
ble interest in the land itself—again an interest that is binding on anyone
who acquires the power to compromise that interest with notice of it.4  The
shares that otherwise belonged wholly to the transferee would be specifically performable.
Id. at 2, 5.  Lord Jenkins (dissenting in the result but not on this point) wrote: “The con-
structive trust in favour of a purchaser which arises on the conclusion of a contract for sale
is founded [on] the purchaser’s right to enforce the contract in proceedings for specific
performance.” Id. at 10 (Lord Jenkins, dissenting).  Specific performance unpacked is an
equitable right against obstruction or diversion of the flow of what a person has coming to
her, the conceptual and normative basis of which is found in equity, not contract.  As an
equitable remedy, specific performance is inherently a matter of judicial discretion, a fea-
ture of the remedy at risk of being overlooked in contexts where courts consistently favor
awarding specific performance, such as agreements for the purchase and sale of land.  On
the inherently discretionary nature of the remedy even so, see, for example, Maryland Clay
Co. v. Simpers, 53 A. 424, 425–26 (Md. 1902), where the court wrote that “it is as much a
matter of course for a court of equity to decree specific performance of it as it is for a court
of law to give damages for a breach of it,” all while maintaining that “specific execution is a
matter not of absolute right in the party, but of sound discretion in the court.” Id. at 425
(quoting Popplein v. Foley, 61 Md. 381, 385 (1884)).  Even where courts have suggested
that specific performance “should generally be granted as a matter of course or right
regarding a contract for the sale of real estate,” they have insisted that specific perform-
ance may yet be refused, such as “when specific performance would be inequitable or
unjust due to hardship on the one from whom performance is sought,” preserving the
discretionary nature of the remedy.  Mohrlang v. Draper, 365 N.W.2d 443, 446–47 (Neb.
1985); see also John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, From Riggs v Palmer to Shelley v
Kraemer: Judicial Power and the Law-Equity Distinction, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
THE LAW OF EQUITY 291, 303 (Dennis Klimchuk, Irit Samet & Henry E. Smith eds., 2020)
(observing that, although courts often award specific performance for certain classes of
contracts, specific performance remains an equitable remedy that is given as of discretion
and not as of right).
4 This equitable interest is sometimes treated as a kind of constructive trust. See, e.g.,
Payne v. Clark, 187 A.2d 769, 770 (Pa. 1963) (“[T]he vendor is considered as a trustee of
the real estate for the purchaser and the latter becomes a trustee of the balance of the
purchase money for the seller.” (citing Kerr v. Day, 14 Pa. 112 (1850)).  This too does not
gainsay the bedrock principle that specific performance is a discretionary remedy.  The
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agreement itself figures in equity’s reasoning about what we have coming to
us: it is because there was an agreement to buy and sell that equity takes the
view it does of what the vendor/purchaser had coming to them.
This account runs against conventional ways of thinking about specific
performance in private law theory as either a reparative remedy like dam-
ages, representing the next best thing when the first best is unavailable,5 or
the direct enforcement of the primary duty to perform a contract—both
tracking the logic of an underlying contractual relationship.6  I will argue, by
contrast, that specific performance involves a form of right, different from
court in Payne v. Clark added that “[w]hile the courts of equity have the power to grant
specific performance, the exercise of the power is discretionary.  In other words, such a
decree is of grace and not of right.” Id. at 771 (citing Mrahunec v. Fausti, 121 A.2d 878
(Pa. 1956)).  As this Article reveals, I think the idea of a constructive trust is, in most of the
contexts in which it is deployed, just a way of describing an equitable interest in what a
person has coming to her, the flow of which equity protects, against obstruction, diversion, etc.
by another.
5 JOHN GARDNER, FROM PERSONAL LIFE TO PRIVATE Law 100–02 (2018).  John Gardner
points out that specific performance has the same qualities of a “next best” response that
characterizes damages and other private law remedies. Id. at 100.  There is nothing special
about it—a “reparative” logic underlies both specific performance and damages. Id. at
101.
6 See especially, STEPHEN A. SMITH, RIGHTS, WRONGS, AND INJUSTICES: THE STRUCTURE
OF REMEDIAL LAW 146–71 (2019), but compare with Mindy Chen-Wishart, Specific Perform-
ance and Change of Mind, in COMMERCIAL REMEDIES: RESOLVING CONTROVERSIES 98, 98 (Gra-
ham Virgo & Sarah Worthington eds., 2017), highlighting that while specific performance
can aim at enforcing a contractual duty, it does so only as a result of a court having
weighed all factors relevant to assessing the appropriate remedy, including respect for the
promisor’s autonomy to change her mind and to not perform.  The extent to which spe-
cific performance is viewed as flowing directly from the parties’ contractual duties is inti-
mately connected to what one considers to be the justification for the binding nature of
contracts. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Damages and Specific Relief, 27 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 247, 247
(1979) (“No aspect of a system of contract law is more revealing of its underlying assump-
tions than is the law that prescribes the relief available for breach.”); see also STEPHEN WAD-
DAMS, PRINCIPLE AND POLICY IN CONTRACT LAW: COMPETING OR COMPLEMENTARY CONCEPTS?
175 (2011) (observing the connection between specific performance and the notion of
“principle”: “Everything depends on what is taken by a writer to be ‘the principle,’ or the
conceptual starting point.”).  For example, Jonathan Morgan suggests that, were the prom-
issory stance on the explanation of the binding nature of contracts adopted, specific per-
formance would lose its exceptional status in favor of (more) general applicability.
Jonathan Morgan, On the Nature and Function of Remedies for Breach of Contract, in COMMER-
CIAL REMEDIES, supra, at 23, 35.  Randy Barnett puts forward a presumption in favor of
specific performance based on a “consent theory of contract.”  Randy E. Barnett, Contract
Remedies and Inalienable Rights, SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y, no. 1, 1986, at 179, 179–80.  Barbara
Fried highlights that at least for a liberal contract theorist, it would be difficult to argue for
prevailing of the promisee by granting specific performance when what the promisee
agreed to was “to give the promisor a free option to walk away from the contemplated
exchange.”  Barbara H. Fried, The Holmesian Bad Man Flubs His Entrance, 45 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 627, 634 (2012). But see Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philoso-
phy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489, 489–90 (1989) (arguing against theories about
promising as capable of explaining choices of contractual remedies).
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secondary remedial rights to compensation for breach, that requires its own
normative and conceptual footing.7  This, on my account, is the equitable
right to what we have coming to us.
In this Article, I will unpack the distinctive nature and structure of an
equitable interest in what we have coming to us and the negotiable duty that
protects it.  I will discuss this theory of equitable remedies with respect to
contracts (specific performance, the remedial constructive trust), unfair com-
petition (accounting and injunctions), property (injunctive relief in a nui-
sance action), and court actions (interlocutory injunctions, asset protection).
In all of these instances, equity enters the scene to protect a party’s interests
in the realization of a legal state of affairs, a state of affairs that is contingent
on factors beyond the scope of the legal interests at play.  In each instance,
equity intervenes to ensure that others do not obstruct or divert what another
has coming to her.  It does so in respects that are not necessitated by the
relationships at the outset (e.g., at the time a contract was entered into) or
even at the conclusion (e.g., at the time a contract is performed).8  In this
sense, the equitable rights protected by these remedies are rights to a “flow”
of value—inhering in a thing or otherwise—free of interruptions, blockages,
or diversions.  In the background of this account of equitable remedies is a
view of equity as responding to our vulnerability to others’ derailing our
plans—legitimately hatched through the only legal mechanisms available to
us, i.e., the exercise of our powers to contract, the exercise of ownership
authority to set agendas for things, the exercise of our liberty to compete, etc.
7 See Lionel Smith, Understanding Specific Performance, in COMPARATIVE REMEDIES FOR
BREACH OF CONTRACT 221 (Nili Cohen & Ewan McKendrick eds., 2005).  Smith argues that
the right to performance is in itself a kind of patrimonial entitlement, a property-like right,
which is protected against expropriation by the defendant. See id. at 226.  For a survey of
the interlinked nature of right and remedy, see WADDAMS, supra note 6, at 177–79.  I take
my own argument to be in a similar vein as Smith’s although I develop here a very different
conceptual and normative footing for that distinctive form of right.
8 Even if the contract is fully performed or its breach fully compensated, the party
may not have received what she had coming to her.  That is because equity takes a broader
perspective than contract law on what a party had coming to her: the seller of land bought
for condo development may have fully discharged her contractual obligations by transfer-
ring the land.  If the seller transfers without an easement allowing cranes to turn around
overhead, she has effectively compromised the interest in what the buyer had coming to
her: the acquisition of land for the purposes of development.  The equitable standpoint on
what a person has coming to her brings the good of the contract into view, when that was
the good the parties together had aimed at.  Here the seller knew the future state of affairs
meant to be realized by means of that contract but retained the power to compromise the
buyer’s interest in what she had coming to her.  Equity on my account does well to inter-
vene in this kind of case to prevent the seller from exercising her power to compromise
that interest so long as she has notice of it.  Again, as we will see, equitable principles are
generally informed by common sense and community standards: not any expectation to
profit from a contract is going to translate into the kind of interest in what you had coming
to you that equity will protect.  But those reasonable expectations do—informed by com-
mon sense, industry practice, and particular course of dealings.
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I. WHAT WE HAVE COMING TO US
Equitable remedies like specific performance, injunctions, and construc-
tive trusts go beyond the enforcement of legal rights (our property rights,
which relate only to what we already have) and contractual rights (which
relate only to another’s duty to perform as agreed).9  These equitable reme-
dies stand as the recognition and protection of a distinct equitable right to
the free, unobstructed flow of what a person has coming to her, as a party to
a contract, as a competitor in a free market, as a neighbor, as a party to a
lawsuit, and more.10
9 Hanoch Dagan and Michael Heller have argued that the “traditional view” in the
United States is “a more-or-less bright line rule in which specific performance is granted as
a matter of course to the injured party in all agreements for the sale of land.”  Hanoch
Dagan & Michael Heller, Specific Performance 37 (Sept. 2, 2020) (unpublished manu-
script) (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=3647336) (citations omitted).  In making
this claim, Dagan and Heller imply that the traditional U.S. view eschews any discretion for
courts and that specific performance follows automatically, as a matter of right. See id. at
37–38.  They point to the fact that courts have held damages to be inadequate for land
contracts as a matter of law, such that no specific proof that the particular parcel of land in
question is unique is required. See id. at 37 & nn.88–89, 38 n.90 (first citing SMS Fin., LLC
v. CBC Fin. Corp., 417 P.3d 70, 75 (Utah 2017); then citing Keystone Sheep Co. v. Grear,
263 P.2d 138, 142 (Wyo. 1953); and then citing Kann v. Wausau Abrasives Co., 129 A. 374,
378 (N.H. 1925)).  However, Dagan and Heller conflate the question of whether damages
are invariably inadequate in the case of land contracts with the question of whether spe-
cific performance is a discretionary remedy.  Though a number of U.S. courts have
answered the former question in the affirmative, they have not thereby denied that specific
performance is a discretionary remedy rather than a remedy as of right.  For example, the
court in Kann v. Wausau Abrasives Co. held that land contracts are irreparable by damages
as a matter of law but insisted that “the precise remedy eventually awarded, whether spe-
cific performance or an injunction against a breach of the defendant’s negative promise,
must of necessity depend upon an equitable consideration of all the evidentiary facts and
circumstances.” Kann, 129 A. at 379.  As this quotation reveals, there is no inconsistency in
holding that damages are invariably inadequate as a matter of law and yet that specific
performance is a discretionary remedy.  Discretionary, contextual considerations may mili-
tate against, and ultimately foreclose, an award of specific performance.  The Supreme
Court of Canada has taken a different view from U.S. courts, requiring evidence that the
land in question is unique. See Semelhago v. Paramadevan, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 415, 429
(Can.).  The difference between U.S. and Canadian law on this point is not that specific
performance is not a discretionary remedy in the United States, contra Dagan & Heller,
supra, at 39–40, but rather that in Canadian law, plaintiffs have the additional burden of
proving that the land in question is unique.  U.S. courts will presume as much and move
directly to whether any other equitable considerations militate against the award of specific
performance. See also supra note 3 (discussing the inherently discretionary nature of equi-
table remedies).
10 Competitors can have an equitable interest in what they have coming to them,
where the content of that interest does not reflect the contractual arrangements between
the parties but the practice of fair competition.  I will explain equity’s willingness to award
an injunction in cases like International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918),
as equity’s recognition of a right to what you have coming to you, translating into a duty
not to exercise certain forms of power to divert value or obstruct the channels through
which it flows.
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The content of this equitable right—what exactly a person has coming to
her from equity’s standpoint—varies across a range of human interactions.
Equity looks to a person’s legal relationships in contract or property law––the
background rules of fair competition––to construct an (equitable) account
of what a person has coming to her as a participant in the private law order.11
Consider what a person has coming to her as a party to a contract for the
purchase and sale of Blackacre or as owner of a holiday property (designed
to provide calme absolu),12 or the holder of a contractual right to remain the
beneficiary on another’s life insurance policy.  In the first case, the buyer
does not already have Blackacre (but a contractual right to acquire it), in the
second, the owner does not have calme absolu, but the power to set an agenda
that might lead to it, and, in the last case, she does not already have the
proceeds from the policy, but the contractual right to be maintained as the
beneficiary of the policy.  Something more has to happen in each case for
that person as the holder of the relevant contractual right or the property
right finally to emerge as the owner of Blackacre, the enjoyer of calme absolu,
the recipient of the insurance proceeds: the seller has to exercise her power
to grant Blackacre; neighbors must also deal with their land in a manner that
is consistent with realization of peace and tranquility in the countryside in
July; the holder of the insurance policy has to die with the policy paid up and
without having changed the named beneficiary.  The underlying right in con-
tract or property points to what one has coming to her (Blackacre, calme
absolu, insurance proceeds)—but it does not guarantee its flow.
It falls to equity to prevent others from compromising an interest in
what one has coming to her.  When equity does so, the mechanism it uses is a
negotiable duty that constrains whoever now has the power to compromise
that interest by obstructing or diverting its flow.  This negotiable duty travels
to whoever bears the power to compromise the equitable interest.  A negotia-
ble duty functions like a negotiable right.  Rather than “pay to the person
whose name appears here ____ or to the bearer of the note . . .”, we say
“demand from the person whose name appears here ____ or the holder of
this position . . . .”
Now the person in the position to compromise another’s interest in what
she has coming to her is usually the person on the other end of the contract,
but not always.  Third parties may be in a position to interfere with or to
obstruct that equitable interest. The equitable duty can travel from the origi-
nal party to the contract to a third party who has assumed the levers of power
to interfere with the interests of the right-holder, by, for instance, acquiring
11 WADDAMS, supra note 6, at 204.
12 Recently in the South of France, I was struck by how many sellers of holiday homes
routinely listed calme absolu alongside pool, terrace, etc. as an attribute of the property
(North Americans emphasize the views), notwithstanding that this is at best a valuable
benefit that a person has coming to her so long as the neighbors don’t exercise their
powers to compromise it.  See discussion below of nuisance and the role of injunctions in
protecting what we have coming to us (versus repairing damage to what we already have). See
infra notes 61–62 and accompanying text.
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ownership of land on which the fulfilment of the contract depends (some-
thing that explains restrictive covenants as I will explain shortly).
The need for equity to recognize and to protect our interest in “what we
have coming to us” is at the same time a recognition of a gap between what
contracts (or property, legal orders, etc.) aim for—to bring about a planned-
for state of affairs—and what these legal rights actually do, which is to obli-
gate ordinary people to exercise other independent powers they have to
bring about that state of affairs.13  This point is perhaps most readily grasped
in relation to contracts, although I will argue it obtains in other contexts, too.
Contracts always have in view something that is beyond what contracts as such
are able to deliver because an agreement to do something is not in itself the
doing of it.  A contract undeniably obligates a person to do something.  But
when she simply does not do it, contract law recognizes that she did not do it:
contract law, in other words, allows for the possibility of breach, and reme-
dies for breach are aimed at repairing the losses that result.  Put another way,
a contract for the sale of property does not and cannot in itself convey the
property in the subject matter of the contract.14  This is bedrock in the struc-
ture of private law, explaining why it is just from a legal standpoint to refuse a
person priority in a bankruptcy proceeding with respect to property she had
agreed to buy from the bankrupt, and indeed already paid for, but had not
yet had delivered to her.  I have in mind cases like Re London Wines.15  In
London Wines, the plaintiffs had arranged to purchase bottles of wine from
the bankrupt defendant and had paid for them but had not taken possession
of them when the defendant was pressed into bankruptcy and insolvency pro-
ceedings.  Instead, the plaintiffs had been issued scrips entitling them to
delivery of the number of bottles they had paid for, the bottles themselves
remaining in the warehouse unallocated to any particular buyer.  The court
denied the buyers any property interest in any of the bottles because property
rights attach only to particular things you already have, not what you have
coming to you.16  From a legal standpoint, the buyers, not yet having
acquired property rights in any particular bottles of wine, suffered no injus-
tice in being treated as mere unsecured creditors, in line with others.  Mere
contractual rights do not in themselves generate rights to what you have com-
ing to you through the contract.
13 Legislation has made it so that some contracts, bills of ladings, and sales of goods
are instantly executed and require nothing further.  See, for example, real estate lease
contracts according to Residential Tenancies Act, S.O. 2006, c 17 § 13(1) (Can.) (“The
term or period of a tenancy begins on the day the tenant is entitled to occupy the rental
unit under the tenancy agreement.”).
14 Peter Benson wants us to see a contractual right to something as a form of property
in it. See PETER BENSON, JUSTICE IN TRANSACTIONS: A THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW 25 (2019);
Peter Benson, Contract as a Transfer of Ownership, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1673, 1693–94
(2007).  That is perhaps where we end up through equity’s intervention, but I do not think
that we can construe contract and contract doctrine on its own as producing that result.
15 Re London Wine Co (Shippers) Ltd. [1986] PCC 121 (Eng.); see also Re Goldcorp
Exchange Ltd. [1994] UKPC 3 (appeal taken from N.Z.).
16 Re London Wine Co, [1986] PCC 121.
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Here then lies the potential for injustice: law cannot do any better than
to empower us to commit to bringing about a state of affairs and then to hold
us accountable for letting others down, by paying for the loss, if we fail to
follow through.  The possibility of breach is entirely consistent with the logic
of private law17: people make agreements and they break them, which is pre-
cisely why the starting point for contractual remedies is that one person has
defected and so the focus is on working out how much of the resulting loss
falls to the defecting party.
But from equity’s standpoint, the breach of a contractual duty does not
exhaust the ways that one person might compromise another’s interest in
what she has coming to her (fulfill what law demands of her but still leave the
other disappointed).18  Nor does a remedy for breach wholly protect that
interest: remedies for breach of contract––damages—protect the narrower
contractual right that correlates to the contractual obligation to perform as
agreed.  Private law remedies are not meant to protect against the diversion,
“expropriation,” or yet other means of interfering with what we had coming
to us that do not involve a breach by the party diverting the gain to himself.19
Any further protection of our interest in what we have coming to us, ought to
be and is found in equity, through the imposition of a duty constraining the
power to compromise that equitable interest.20
17 For a discussion of the normative foundations, see Chen-Wishart supra note 6, at 98.
18 Take, for example, cases where a seller agrees to sell land knowing that the buyer
wants to build a condo tower.  Seller fulfills the contract, transferring the parcel of land but
without an easement to allow buyer’s cranes to pass through airspace during construction.
Equitable intervention here is called for to protect what the buyer had coming to him
(refusing the seller a remedy continuing trespass for instance, etc.). See also supra note 8.
19 See WADDAMS, supra note 6, at 97 (discussing Lumley v. Wagner [1852] EWHC (Ch)
J96, 42 Eng. Rep. 687).
20 The well-known but controversial case of Hunter v. Moss [1993] EWCA (Civ) 11, 1
WLR 452 (Eng.), is an illustration of how equity intervenes to protect what a person had
coming to her by constraining another’s power to divert or to obstruct its flow.  In Hunter
v. Moss, an employer let an employee know that he intended to transfer 50 out of 1000
shares to him and some months later, in a conversation with that employee, made an oral
declaration of trust. Id. The background circumstances made clear that this was not just a
gift but part of a set of arrangements designed to satisfy a prior understanding between the
employer and employee about his position relative to another employee who had earlier
received a similar transfer.  The employer later sold all 1000 shares and kept the proceeds.
In resisting the employee’s claim for five percent of the proceeds of the sale, the employer
argued that the trust had never come into existence. Id. Express trusts, like outright trans-
fers of property right in law, must satisfy certainty of subject-matter requirements and this
the trust clearly failed to do because the employer had not set aside or otherwise specified
which 50 out of the 1000 shares were subject to the trust.  The court found in favor of the
employee, id., but its reasoning has always been controversial.  The disagreement for the
most part has turned on whether the court loosened certainty of subject-matter require-
ments for fungible things, like shares—we don’t need to know which 50 of the 1000 were
trust assets but only that five percent of the 1000 are—or whether the problem of certainty
of subject matter was avoided by finding sufficient certainty of intention to hold the whole
1000 shares on trust for the employer and employee in the agreed-upon proportions
(50:950).  There would have been no certainty of subject matter on that theory of the case
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The separate but related spheres of private law and equity come into
focus by recognizing the very different function and operation of this kind of
equitable interest and the duties that protect them.  Whereas private law
operates by setting out the framework within which private actors interact as
of right, equity operates much more directly on people, through its coercive
mechanisms.  Thus, private law may obligate people to exercise personal
powers in a certain way (to transfer land by grant to another, to name them
beneficiary, etc.), but leaves it to the obligor to follow through by actually
exercising those powers.  Equity by contrast is the most directly coercive
branch of law, commanding personal obedience to bring about the very out-
comes that the integrity of the legal system as a whole requires from an equi-
table standpoint.21  Equity thus conscripts citizens to complete what private
because there would have been no need to separate out trust from nontrust assets: all the
shares would have been trust assets.  The beneficiaries would have been equitable tenants
in common of the whole.  A wholly different, and I want to argue better, way of looking at
the case is as an equitable intervention to protect the employee’s equitable interest in what
he had coming to him (five percent of the shares and their proceeds), by means of a
constructive trust.  That equitable interest did not arise out of a specifically enforceable
contract for the creation of a trust (the court found none on the facts) but on a specifically
enforceable promise made in the context of a special relationship between employer and
employee, in which presumably employers are in a position to extract over time greater
concessions and more value from employees through the making of these promises.  Spe-
cifically enforceable promises are those promises that from an equitable standpoint gener-
ate the kind of interest in what a person has coming to her that warrants protection.  This
is the kind of interest that from an equitable standpoint is sufficient to justify constraints
on another’s power to compromise that interest.
If we treat Hunter v. Moss as a case of constructive trust, protecting the employee’s
interest in what he had coming to him from diversion or obstruction by the employer (who
as owner of the shares retained the power to compromise his interest), the decision rests
on a different and more stable footing.  The content of that equitable interest is shaped by
the content of the employer’s noncontractually binding promise to hold five percent of the
shares on trust.  What that equitable right requires of the employer is not the performance
of his promise to constitute the trust of the shares: that is no longer possible because the
shares have since been sold.  Rather what it requires is that the employer not obstruct the
employee’s receipt of what he had coming to him by diverting the proceeds of the sale of
the shares to himself.  The constructive trust in Hunter v. Moss protects the kind of equita-
ble interest in what a person has coming to him also found in the context of a specifically
enforceable contract or a legal order.
21 Nowhere is equity’s coercive standpoint clearer than in the context of its character-
istic procedure, the writ of subpoena, that did not name the plaintiff at all, but, resting on
the authority of the state, commanded appearance on pain of arrest and imprisonment.  If
ignored, the chancellor would issue a commission of rebellion, authorizing certain others
to hunt down and arrest the defendant. See W.M. Ormrod, The Origins of the Sub Pena Writ,
61 HIST. RSCH. 11, 11 (1988).  Oliver Wendell Holmes recognized the special force of equi-
table decrees and the personal obedience they demand. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES,
Early English Equity, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 1 (1921) (citing Audeley v. Audeley, 40
Edw. III) (“[Equity] had a form of decree requiring personal obedience.”).  Holmes goes
further in The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra, at 167, 175–76 (describ-
ing this personal command of obedience as the only real duty, other private law duties
being just a set of options, with prices attached).  Holmes’s mistake is to see duty as just the
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law anticipates but does not in itself achieve through the enforcement of
contract and protection of property.
I have been talking a lot about this kind of equitable interest in connec-
tion to contract.  But it will become clear that the equitable interest in what
we have coming to us should not be seen just as an appendage to contract.  A
court order requiring the transfer of property, for instance, generates the
same form of equitable interest as the specifically performable contract.  In
Mountney v. Treharne,22 which has since been endorsed by the Ontario Court
of Appeal,23 a husband was ordered in divorce proceedings to transfer to his
wife certain property that his wife and their children occupied.24  Before
making the transfer, the husband became bankrupt.25  The English Court of
Appeal held that the court order was effective to create an equitable interest
in the property that bound the trustee in bankruptcy.26  I will turn later to
contexts where equity recognizes and protects an interest in what we have
coming to us independently of contract, where the essence of the equitable
right is constant even as the nature of the legal rights and privileges that
accompany it vary.
II. MULTIPARTY UNJUST ENRICHMENT
The account I develop of an equitable right against obstruction or diver-
sion of what we have coming to us makes sense of an otherwise bizarre form
of unjust enrichment outlined in a recent Supreme Court of Canada (SCC)
decision, Moore v. Sweet.27  This form of unjust enrichment is difficult to rec-
oncile with conventional thinking about what makes an enrichment just or
unjust.  On the conventional view, a person is justly enriched where there is a
juridical basis for the enrichment in contract, gift, debt, trust, statute, etc.,
that accounts for the transfer of value from one person to another.  A person
is unjustly enriched where she has received value from another, and there is
no juridical reason for that enrichment.  Let’s call this the typical case of
unjust enrichment, involving a direct, bilateral relationship between the
recipient of value and the person at whose expense it is received.  To be
enriched at another’s expense in this sense involves receiving value that the
other person originally had.  If they did not have that value in the first place
(in the form of a property right or a right to their person), they had nothing
that they could be said to have been deprived of, on the occasion of
another’s enrichment.
product of coercion.  His point about equity as a coercive mechanism is well taken,
however.
22 [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1174, 3 WLR 1760 (Eng.).
23 Thibodeau v. Thibodeau, 2011 ONCA 110, (2011) 104 O.R. 3d 161, para. 26 (Can.
Ont. C.A.).
24 Mountney [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1174, para. 2.
25 Id.
26 Id. para. 76.
27 2018 SCC 52, [2018] 3 S.C.R. 303 (Can.).
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In Moore v. Sweet, the SCC pointed to another form of unjust enrichment
that muddies the clear distinction between just and unjust enrichments: a
form of unjust enrichment in which a person may have a juridical basis for
the enrichment (in gift, debt, etc.) but still can be said to have been unjustly
enriched at another’s expense.28  This form of unjust enrichment involves a
transfer from A to B at the expense of C, where A (not C) is the originator of
the value and B can point to gift, debt, or some other juridical basis vis-à-vis A
for A’s transfer to her.29
In Moore v. Sweet, the petitioner (C) and the deceased (A) were married
with three children.30  During their marriage, A bought a term life insurance
policy, naming C the revocable beneficiary.31 A was improvident and insol-
vent.32  This policy was meant to enable C to provide for the children when A
died, the only contribution to their care that A was then in a position to
make.33  After the marriage broke down, A and C orally agreed that she
would remain the beneficiary if she paid the premiums.34  She paid.35  He
then turned around and designated his new wife B the irrevocable benefici-
ary pursuant to a provision in the Insurance Act.36 B cared for the deceased,
who was disabled, for thirteen years.37 B had notice of the arrangement
between A and C.38  At the same time, B’s sacrifices and contributions, as a
caregiver with health issues of her own and very limited economic means, led
the court to look upon her as a good faith recipient of the insurance pro-
ceeds.39  After A’s death, C sought a constructive trust over the insurance
monies paid out to B.40
The court of appeal and the dissent at the SCC insisted that all C could
possibly have in a case like this was a claim for breach of contract against an
28 Id. para. 69.
29 I do not develop the idea here, but Moore v. Sweet also suggests why we should think
of the improvements in a person’s position as just enrichments where there is a decision to
be made to award either specific performance or damages: what you get through specific
performance is the enforcement of the equitable right, shaped by an equitable construc-
tion of what you had coming to you.  This is informed by the contractual relationship
between the parties but is not the exact equivalent of the right to performance agreed to.
(The parallel is the remedy of account, where what the beneficiary is in the end entitled to
is the result of an equitable reconstruction of the books as they ought to be, rather than as
they are.  When equity surcharges the account to reflect what ought to have been received
but wasn’t, the beneficiary is not unjustly enriched by the trustee’s payment to the benefici-
ary out of pocket in the amount of the surcharge.)
30 Moore, 2018 SCC 52, para. 4.
31 Id.
32 Id. para. 11.
33 See id.
34 Id. para. 5.
35 Id. para. 10.
36 Id. para. 7; Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c I.8, §§ 190, 191 (Can.).
37 Moore, 2018 SCC 52, para. 6.
38 See id. para. 7.
39 Id. para. 39.
40 Id. para. 31.
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insolvent estate.41  On their view, C’s contractual right to be maintained the
beneficiary is self-evidently not an in rem right in the subject matter of the
contract, enforceable against a third party.
The majority at the SCC, however, took a different view and awarded a
constructive trust over the insurance monies, imposing a duty on B, the sec-
ond wife, to account to C for the proceeds of the insurance policy.42  Had the
court shrouded its decision to award a constructive trust in a general moral
principle of “unconscionability,” the decision would have been much easier
to understand even if, in the end, it remained unsatisfactory.43  There was
unconscionability in the air in this case: A had a (judicially recognized)44
moral obligation to provide for his children that lent further moral force to
his contractual obligation to maintain C as his beneficiary.  It was uncon-
scionable of him to take the benefits of their arrangement (her paying his
premiums) stripped of the burdens (forbearing from exercising his statutory
power to designate his new wife).  Less obvious is how the unconscionability
of A’s conduct crystallizes into a constructive trust binding innocent B who
herself had good moral reason to claim support from A or his estate, being
disabled herself and having sacrificed the last thirteen years in the support of
A.  One can imagine some sort of balancing of moral reasons for funneling
the money to C versus B, had the decision rested on the demands of good
conscience.  In the end, the court insisted that this was a remedial construc-
tive trust requiring an independent equitable foundation.45  The court took
the view that unjust enrichment was the independent equitable foundation
of the constructive trust in this case.46  What I want to suggest is that latent in
the court’s reasoning is the recognition of an independent equitable right in
what C had coming to her, the very same kind of equitable right (and the
very same kind of equitable duty) that accompanies specifically performable
contracts and that grounds an award of constructive trust.
The first thing to notice is that despite the court’s insistence that this is a
case of unjust enrichment, this is clearly not the typical case of bilateral
unjust enrichment. B had not received the enrichment directly from C.
41 Id. paras. 51, 102.
42 Id. para. 96.
43 It remains unclear whether a pure “good conscience” constructive trust, unattached
to any preexisting equitable foundation, is available in Canada.  These are constructive
trusts “to be applied in cases where the defendant cannot conscientiously keep the prop-
erty for himself alone, but ought to allow another to have the property or a share in it.”
Hussey v. Palmer [1972] EWCA (Civ) 1, [1972] 1 WLR 1286 (Eng.). See also Moore v.
Sweet, 2017 ONCA 182, para. 147 (Can. Ont. C.A.) (Lauwers, J.A., dissenting) (citing Hus-
sey [1972] EWCA (Civ.) 1); BNSF Ry. Co. v. Teck Metals Ltd., 2016 BCCA 350, paras. 45–46
(Can. B.C. C.A.) (same).
44 Tataryn v. Tataryn, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 807, 815 (Can.).
45 The SCC found that the constructive trust is “primarily” remedial and that a remedial
constructive trust requires an independent equitable foundation, e.g. resulting from unjust
enrichment or the breach of a fiduciary obligation. Moore, 2018 SCC 52, para. 32 (empha-
sis added).
46 See id.
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Although C paid some of the premiums that maintained the policy, C never
owned the policy itself.47  What we get from the SCC, then, is an attempt to
articulate a multilateral form of unjust enrichment: a deprivation for the pur-
poses of unjust enrichment is not limited to “out-of-pocket” expenditures typ-
ical of “two-party” unjust enrichment scenarios.48  The concept of
deprivation also captures the diversion of benefits that would otherwise have
accrued to a plaintiff from the discharge of a third party’s obligation to her.
Where those benefits that would have accrued to a plaintiff are diverted to
the defendant, the plaintiff is enriched, and the defendant is correspond-
ingly deprived.  Putting this in the language of unjust enrichment, the court
found that B was unjustly enriched at the expense of C because B had
received a benefit that would have accrued to C had A fulfilled the obligation
to C, a deprivation achieved through the very mechanism that enriched B
(the irrevocable designation of B as the new beneficiary).
The award of constructive trust in this case could be understood more
straightforwardly as the specific enforcement of an equitable interest in what
C had coming to her, where a principle against unjust enrichment is not a
cause of action to be plead49 so much as a normative principle that under-
pins equity’s protection of the right of what one person has coming to her
against diversion to another.  It is particularly instructive here to reflect on
the role of the contract between A and C.  The contract drives equity’s view
of what C had coming to her—the interest protected by way of the construc-
tive trust.  The contract between A and C is not itself enforced, nor is the
breach of contract remedied through the imposition of a constructive trust.
But the contract shapes the content of the equitable interest that is protected
47 Moore, 2018 SCC 52, para. 2. But see Foskett v. McKeown [2000] UKHL 29, [2001] 1
AC 102 (HL).  There, the court, for different reasons, held that the use of trust monies to
pay three out of five premiums paid before the trustee’s death gave the trust a 3/5 share in
the payout. Id.  That case can be distinguished on the basis that the monies used there
were taken in breach of trust, subjecting the beneficiaries to an involuntarily assumed risk
of a delayed payout (the expected lifespan of the insured) and explaining the willingness
there of the court to treat the payment of premiums with trust monies as monies used in
the acquisition of the bundles of rights that was the policy rather than as improvements
made to a preexisting thing (justifying at best a debt action for their return).  Here the
contract between husband and wife (A and C) displaces even the “debt for improvement”
analysis that might justify an equitable charge or lien over the policies, and also the equita-
ble reasons favoring a very loose analysis of the “originator” of the thing transferred.
48 Moore, 2018 SCC 52, para. 52.
49 This brings the role of unjust enrichment in relation to the constructive trust in this
context in line with the role of unjust enrichment in relation to resulting trusts generally,
i.e., regarding the normative basis for equity’s recognition of them.  That has implications
for pleadings: in BNSF Ry. Co. v. Teck Metals, the British Columbia Court of Appeal took the
view that a good-conscience, i.e., substantive/nonremedial, constructive trust was still avail-
able in Canada after the decision in Soulos v. Korkontzilas, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.), and
that the “availability of constructive trust need not be decided on the basis of pleadings.
Being dependent on facts found at trial, the issue can be resolved once the plaintiff is able
to make an ‘informed choice’ prior to final judgment being pronounced.”  2016 BCCA
350, para. 83 (citations omitted).
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in the form of a constructive trust, just as it does in more familiar cases of a
specifically performable contract.  The SCC recognized the importance of
C’s contractual right, not as the primary right generating a secondary reme-
dial right but as the basis on which from an equitable standpoint a person
could be said to have something coming to her:
In other cases where the plaintiff has some general belief that the insured
ought to have named him . . . as the designated beneficiary, but otherwise
has no legal or equitable right to be treated as the proper recipient of the
insurance money, it will likely be impossible to find either that the right to
receive that insurance money was ever held by the plaintiff or that it would
have accrued to him or her.50
We can see how Moore v. Sweet might be distinguished from the “disap-
pointed heir”–type cases: C’s contractual right marks the difference.  What
marks the difference between this contract, standing as the contractual basis
for an equitable interest in what a person has coming to her, and other con-
tracts?  This of course was the court of appeal’s worry: that all contracts
would be in effect specifically performable.  We will see in the discussion of
nuisance and fair competition below that the content of what a person has
coming to her is not just a matter of the terms of the contract itself but
requires a larger equitable construction of what a person has coming to her
assuming away force, fraud, and otherwise improper tactics (which are unrea-
sonable, violate community standards, etc.) that might get in the way of its
flow.  In Moore v. Sweet, the court calculated what C had coming to her by
assuming a world in which A would not breach his contract because that
breach could only be achieved through the violation of a judicially recog-
nized moral obligation to provide for his children.  Equity, in short, dis-
counted the possibility of breach getting in the way of C’s actually realizing
the benefit of that contract—the insurance money—and was left with the
view that what she has coming to her is the insurance monies.51
50 Moore, 2018 SCC 52, para. 47.
51 A person may not receive equity’s protection either in cases where the contract
allows for the parties to revoke or vary its terms.  In such cases, there may be legitimate
reasons for the diversion of the subject matter of the contract, with the result that equity
should not look at the contract as a reliable channel for the flow of its value to the third
party.  Contrast, for instance, In re Garbett [1963] NZLR 384 (N.Z.), and Schebsman (in
ALBERT H. OOSTERHOFF, ROBERT CHAMBERS & MITCHELL MCINNES, OOSTERHOFF ON TRUSTS
80 (9th ed., 2019)).  Both cases involved contracts between A and B for the benefit of C.
In Schebsman, the judge wrote: “I have little doubt in the present case both parties (and
certainly the debtor) intended to keep alive their common law right to vary consensually
the terms of the obligation.” Id.  C was unable to establish a right in the nature of trust in
the subject matter of the contract although once B performed the contract, she could
defend her right to retain the value received from B against A’s claim in unjust enrichment
for its return.  In Garbett, an argument of the same structure succeeded on the basis that
the agreement between A and B for the benefit of C was irrevocable, and the benefit to C
was not subject to forfeiture even on mutual consent of A and B. Garbett, [1963] NZLR at
390.
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In ordinary contracts, equity allows that you have an expectation interest
but does not treat that expectation interest as the equivalent of the weightier
equitable right to what you have coming to you.  Why?  Because breach is not
in ordinary contract cases always an illicit stratagem to be seen as inequitable
interference with the flow of benefits to a person that equity refuses to coun-
tenance.  Put another way: equity treats contracts as in effect nonbreachable
only in contexts where breach would be unreasonable, violate community
standards, or otherwise represent an illicit move that equity cannot allow to
stand in the way of a person and what she had coming to her from equity’s
standpoint.  This of course matches the lawyers’ understanding of specifically
performable contracts, in which the plaintiff asking for specific performance
is meant to assume the posture of a person whose contract has not been
terminated through breach, despite the clear failure of the other side to per-
form, who has suffered no losses that stand to be mitigated, and who is simply
renewing a call for performance.
Moore v. Sweet makes sense, then, if we understand C to have the very
same kind of equitable interest that arises in specifically performable con-
tracts generally: that is, a right against the obstruction or diversion of what
she has coming to her by anyone with the power to compromise its flow.
This is the kind of interest that persists against a third party like B who has
notice of it.  What was diverted from C to B was the flow of what C had
coming to her.  The constructive trust is just a way of describing C’s equitable
right that another not obstruct nor divert what she had coming to her.  This
usage of “constructive trust” to describe what is after all just an equitable
right constraining another’s power to compromise the flow of benefits is not
new: courts have used the term to describe the equitable right arising out of a
specifically performable contract for the sale of land, the equitable right of
the dominant tenement holder in restrictive covenants cases, and in other
contexts that involve the right to what we have coming to us.
III. RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
In Tulk v. Moxhay,52 the court enforced a covenant restricting the use of
sold land.  In that case, the buyer had sold the land free of any restriction to
someone who had notice of the covenant.  The court addressed the gap
between the protection provided by the covenant itself (as against the cove-
nantor only) and what would be required to protect what the covenantee had
coming to him in light of the covenant he had arranged for prior to selling
the land: the covenantor could fulfill the covenant and still leave the cove-
nantee underprotected, obstructing the flow of benefits to the covenantee/
seller simply by selling the land on to another.53  The value of the covenant
would be lost in that case with the result that “it would be impossible for an
owner of land to sell part of it without incurring the risk of rendering what
52 [1848] EWHC (Ch) J34 (Eng.).
53 See id.
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he retains worthless.”54  When a vendor does what the law requires of her to
negate that risk by imposing a restrictive covenant, equity helps ensure that
the covenant is not empty.
In Tulk, the court protected the seller’s interest in what he had coming
to him: the benefit to his land of the restriction in use of his neighbor’s, by
preventing its obstruction by whoever had the power to compromise that
interest.  That included the original covenantor but also any successors in
interest, “for if an equity is attached to the property by the owner, no one
purchasing with notice of that equity can stand in a different situation from
the party from whom he purchased.”55
The restrictive covenant, enforced by injunction, involves at its core an
equitable interest akin to the interest equity protects in specifically perform-
able contracts and in cases like Moore v. Sweet: an equitable interest in what
one has coming to her, protected by a duty of nonobstruction or diversion
imposed on one who has the power to compromise it.  This form of equitable
right is protected through a negotiable duty, one that travels to whoever
bears the power to compromise the interest with notice of it.56  Seen this way,
restrictive covenants are best understood as equitable rights, not a fragment
of property rights or an addition to the dominant tenement owner’s “bun-
dle.”  Because restrictive covenants are generally studied alongside other
legal property rights, and especially easements, we have lost sight of the con-
nection between restrictive covenants and other equitable rights protected by
negotiable duties.  There remain at least glimmers of this connection in some
cases.  In Lord Strathcona Steamship Co. v. Dominion Coal Co.,57 a controversial
Privy Council case, the logic of Tulk was extended beyond covenants over
land to the purchase of a ship with notice of an ongoing charter agree-
ment.58  Lord Shaw concluded that the purchaser was a constructive trustee
of the ship with obligations to the charterer:
If a man acquires from another rights in a ship which is already under char-
ter, with notice of rights which required the ship to be used for a particular
purpose and not inconsistently with it, then he appears to be plainly in the
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 This was Ames’s view of restrictive covenants, overtaken by a later tendency to think
of restrictive covenants as an equitable form of easement, pushed along by the legal realists
who encouraged the view that the use-right was a “stick” in the “bundle of sticks” represent-
ing property and that had been moved out from the servient owner’s bundle and added to
the dominant tenement owner’s bundle. See J.B. Ames, Specific Performance for and Against
Strangers to the Contract, 17 HARV. L. REV. 174, 185 (1904) (“[T]he true analogue of the
restrictive agreement is the note payable to bearer.”).
57 Lord Strathcona S.S. Co. v. Dominion Coal Co. [1926] AC 108 (PC) (appeal taken
from N.S.).
58 See DONOVAN W.M. WATERS, MARK GILLEN & LIONEL SMITH, WATERS’ LAW OF TRUSTS
IN CANADA 85, 560 (4th ed. 2012).
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position of a constructive trustee with obligations which a Court of Equity
will not permit him to violate.59
IV. NUISANCE AND WHAT OWNERS HAVE COMING TO THEM
Equitable remedies in nuisance cases can also be explained in terms of
the protection of an interest that extends beyond the scope of the legal right
stricto sensu.60  Equity, in the form of an injunction, protects a future flow of
benefits—the owner’s material use and enjoyment of her land—by enjoining
another’s61 exercise of her power to compromise that flow.
The injunction in nuisance cases is not a vindication of ownership
authority itself.  Ownership puts owners in charge of setting an agenda and
protects that position of authority against usurpation or contempt: others do
59 Lord Strathcona S.S. Co., [1926] AC 108, para. 34.  See also Binions v. Evans [1972] 2
All ER 70 (Eng.), which concerned an agreement between a seller and purchasers to allow
the seller’s widow to live in the house after her husband’s death.  The seller sold the land
to the purchasers with notice of agreement and a promise to respect it, and at a lower price
to reflect the restriction.  After purchase, the new occupants sought to evict the widow.
The court found a “constructive trust” in the widow’s favor. See id. at 70, 72–73, 77. But see
BEN MCFARLANE, THE STRUCTURE OF PROPERTY LAW 508–09 (2008) (criticizing the “Con-
structive Trust” approach).  That line of criticism takes aim at the lack of a comprehensive
duty to account to the equitable right-holder for dealings with the property. See also Wil-
liam Swadling, Property: General Principles, in ENGLISH PRIVATE LAW ¶ 4.01, ¶ 4.307 (Andrew
Burrows ed., 3d ed. 2013).  I agree that the language of “trust” is unhelpful here when all
that is really invoked is the idea of an equitable right constraining O2 from exercising her
ownership powers so as to obstruct or divert or destroy what the widow had coming to her:
the use and enjoyment of the cottage as per the agreement with O1.  Equitable rights like
this operate more like targeted constraints, something we see most clearly in the context of
restrictive covenants.  Courts frequently use the term “constructive trust” to refer to equita-
ble rights to what we have coming to us, including those arising out of specifically enforcea-
ble promises.  No, these are not real trusts because they do not impose a blanket duty to
account for all dealings with the land (as we know well in the context of a vendor of land,
subject to a constructive trust for the purchaser).  But yes, these are a kind of equitable
rights that have a common nature and structure and that courts are quite right to recog-
nize.  The repeated use of the same idea of constructive trust in these contexts is a fairly
important indication that there is something that connects the restrictive covenants, the
rights arising from the “receipt after promise” principle, the purchaser’s interest in land
after an agreement for sale, etc.
60 Nuisance belongs to a “class of torts embracing nuisance, repeated trespass, and
continuous trespass, which equity will prevent because the legal remedy is inadequate.”
Comment, Injunction—Mandatory or Prohibitory, 25 YALE L.J. 590 (1916).  A continued tres-
pass is analogous to nuisance. 4 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, JR., A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURIS-
PRUDENCE AND EQUITABLE REMEDIES § 1359, 2697 (3d ed. 1905).   Once we have sorted out
the underlying equitable right and duty that is enforced through an injunction in the
nuisance context, we can by analogy work out why an injunction for a continuing trespass
(a structure or obstruction that remains on the land) or a repeated trespass (e.g., unautho-
rized daily boundary crossings) is also appropriate.
61 Nuisances are usually but not necessarily committed through a neighbor’s exercise
of her property rights.  Others can commit nuisance, too. See, e.g., Hubbard v Pitt [1976]
QB 142 (Eng.).
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wrong when they deal with the thing without authorization.  An owner’s
authority to set the agenda for a thing is not defined in terms of protected
activities or material outcomes.62  The success of any particular agenda will
always depend on powers and circumstances extraneous to the owner’s office
(such as her personal abilities, wealth from other sources, and most impor-
tantly for my purposes, decisions by others—neighbors, passersby, public offi-
cials, etc.).
Through injunctive relief in nuisance law, equity moves beyond the pro-
tection of the owner’s exclusive authority to set the agenda.63  Whereas the
core property right in law is defined according to a formal principle of
authority, the right that others not obstruct or divert what the owner has
coming to her depends on material considerations: what counts as a nuisance,
the basis on which equity awards an injunction, is a matter both of the use
she is making of the land and the standards in that locale for what would
count as unreasonable interference with her use and enjoyment.  Here as in
competition cases, equity invokes material principles of common sense and
community standards—external to the property right itself—to figure out
what an owner has coming to her.  This interest goes beyond what the legal
property right itself guarantees.  The good that is meant to follow from the
owner’s decisions—e.g., peace and quiet, a flow of customers, clean air—is
not something the owner already has in virtue of having ownership rights,
nor can these material benefits be secured through a more thoroughgoing
protection of the formal authority to set the agenda.  A person can have full
authority to set the agenda for her land, not usurped by anyone else, and yet
still suffer the diversion or obstruction of benefits that might reasonably be
expected to flow to her in virtue of being the owner.  What equity adds is the
protection against obstructions or diversions of the flow of the benefit of an
agenda, whether that benefit is enjoying privacy at home, quiet in a doctor’s
consulting room,64 or custom at a truck stop.65
Equity’s intervention in these cases takes the form of a negotiable duty
that falls to anyone who assumes the power to compromise another’s equita-
ble interest in what she has coming to her (a new owner of the neighboring
62 See generally Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J.
275 (2008).
63 This account helps to explain why government-authorized nuisance counts as a tak-
ing of property requiring just compensation: it is a taking of an owner’s interest in what she
has coming to her—a proprietary interest, of a fundamentally equitable character—even
as it does not take or destroy the owner’s capacity to set the agenda for her land. See Carlos
A. Ball, The Curious Intersection of Nuisance and Takings Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 819, 861–67
(2006); Antrim Truck Centre Ltd. v. Ontario (Transp.), 2013 SCC 13 (Can.); Gautam v.
Can. Line Rapid Transit Inc., 2015 BCSC 2038 (Can.), affirmed on the nuisance and takings
compensation issue by Gautam v. S. Coast British Columbia Trans. Auth., 2020 BCCA 135
(Can.).
64 Sturges v. Bridgman [1879] 11 Ch. D. 852 (Eng.).
65 Antrim Truck, 2013 SCC 13 (Can.).
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property, but also tenants and third parties with the power to obstruct or
divert the benefits of an agenda another owner has set).66
V. WHAT COMPETITORS HAVE COMING TO THEM (AND WHY)
Equity also intervenes to protect what a person has coming to her
outside of any contractual or property relationship.  I have in mind here
cases, like INS v. AP,67 where equity’s view of what a person has coming to
her is shaped by an equitably constructed account of fair competition.  The
equitable account of fair competition is constructed (as equitable accounts
generally are) ex post facto, using equitable principles and standards to work
out how competitors ought to interact.  Equity’s framework for evaluating
what a competitor has coming to her rules out force, fraud, and unreasona-
ble strategies by fellow competitors in order to determine what, if the com-
petitors had interacted on equity’s terms, one or the other would have had
coming to her.68
Competition can occur within a procedure for acquiring property rights
where more than one person is on an open pathway to property rights, as in
cases of first possession.  The law of first possession makes competition (the
first to capture with animus possidendi) the procedure for the acquisition of
property rights.  Unlike other procedures for the acquisition of property
rights (sale, grant, etc.), this procedure is open to all comers.  Equity, which
protects the pathways to property rights, confronts an additional complexity
in cases of first possession: competition as a procedure allows for a certain
amount of volatility along the way to the right.  It is to be expected, for
66 See, e.g., Seymour v. McDonald, 4 Sand. Ch. 502 (N.Y. Ch. 1847).  The claimant sold
a lot bordering another he owned to the defendant. Id. at 502.  The deed indicated that
the purchaser could not use the lot as a stone quarry, or for any purpose that would be
“offensive” to the adjoining property or reduce the adjoining property’s value. Id. at 504.
The defendant sought to allow a third party to build a wharf and railway on his newly
acquired land in order to transport stone from the third party’s quarry. Id. at 505.  The
court upheld an injunction prohibiting the erection of a wharf and railway on the defen-
dant’s land, finding that this conduct came within the prohibitions in the conveyance. Id.
at 507.
67 Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
68 What is unreasonable is determined by community standards, i.e., the prevailing
common sense of the time.  Selangor United Rubber Ests. Ltd. v. Cradock (No. 3) [1968] 2
All ER 1073, 1105 (Eng.) (Ungoed-Thomas, J.) (quoting Bodenham v. Hoskyns (1852) 21
L.J. Ch. 864, 873 (Eng.)) (“They are to be understood ‘according to the plain principles of
a court of equity’ to which Sir Richard Kindersley, V.-C., referred [in Bodenham v. Hoskins],
and these principles, in this context at any rate, are just plain, ordinary commonsense.”);
cf. Nicolas Cornell, Competition Wrongs, 129 YALE L.J. 2030, 2034 (2020) (explaining the
wronging in terms of a violation of a community standard but denying that the competitor
who has standing to complain has any particularized interest or right).  While I agree with
Cornell that the violation of a community standard about what counts as acceptable strat-
egy is an important part of the story, I think that this violation of a community standard
ends up figuring in an equitable construction of a protected interest.  It is not a legal right
that is protected, but rather an equitable one, a right that correlates to a specifically per-
formable duty on the part of the defendant.
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instance, that a frontrunner will be passed by a competitor at the last minute.
How then can equity determine that a person nearing the finish line has
suffered a loss when another completes the race ahead of her?  An equitable
framework for fair competition generates a view of what a person has coming
to her absent fraud, force, and stratagems that violate community standards.
Take the case of Popov v. Hayashi.69  Popov was on the point of catching the
ball hit into the stands by Barry Bonds on the occasion of his record-breaking
home run.  He had done everything he could to put himself into the position
he was now in, where the arc of the ball ended in his glove.70  At that
moment, a mob jumped on him, taking him down before he could complete
the catch.71  Hayashi, who was not part of the mob, ended up picking up the
ball and so winning the race to capture first (and so to acquire legal right to
the ball).72  Hayashi did no wrong: he personally violated no community
standard in this competition to capture the ball.  But here is what we can say
from an equitable standpoint: assuming a framework of fair competition, free
from force, fraud, or unreasonable stratagems, Popov, and Popov alone, had
the ball coming to him.  Equity specifically enforces what a person had com-
ing to him within that framework of fair competition by imposing a duty not
to divert or obstruct its flow on whoever now has the power to compromise
that interest.  In this case, that negotiable duty falls on Hayashi, the person
who in fact completed the common-law procedure for acquiring property in
the ball by capturing first).  Equity is not policing wrongs in cases like this; it
does not address itself to the actual wrongdoers in the mob.  It is rather pro-
tecting a competitor’s interest in what she has coming to her from diversion
or obstruction or expropriation by others—and in doing so preserves the
integrity of competition as a procedure for acquiring property rights.
Equity also protects a competitor’s interest in what she has coming to
her outside of the context of a procedure for acquiring specific property
rights.  Something like this interest explains equity’s intervention where the
competition is for profits or value not yet attached to any particular, identifi-
able thing.  My main interest is this second form of competition, an open
competition for profits or value resulting from activity in the marketplace.  It
is in this context that an equitably constructed framework of fair competition
drives equity’s view of what a person has coming to her such that another’s
exercise of a power, diverting those profits to herself, counts as illicit compro-
mising of that interest.  In these competition cases, equitable remedies like
injunction or constructive trust reflect equity’s recognition of an interest in
what a person has coming to her, protected through a negotiable duty not to
divert or obstruct its flow to her.
69 No. 400545, 2002 WL 31833731 (Ca. Sup. Ct. Dec. 18, 2002).
70 Id. at *1.
71 Id. at *2.
72 Id.
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VI. GOODWILL
Goodwill is a good example of a protected channel for the flow of value.
Goodwill is not a right with respect to any identifiable thing, or even any
fixed value, but rather “the attractive force that brings in custom.”73  In tradi-
tional common-law thinking, it was not thought of as property in itself. As
one nineteenth-century court put the point, “goodwill is not property, but an
incident to property; it cannot therefore be dealt with independently of the
property, or have any existence apart from it, or unless there is a going busi-
ness attached to it.”74  The traditional view that goodwill is not property has
softened: for many purposes, courts increasingly treat it as property, notwith-
standing the lack of specificity and separate existence that property usually
requires.75  Indeed, goodwill is now regarded as capable of surviving despite
the inactivity or demise of the underlying business and its physical assets.76
What courts still lack is a vocabulary to describe the nature of this right,
whatever its label, so as to distinguish what we already have (property stricto
sensu) from what we have coming to us.  The Supreme Court of Canada case,
Manitoba Fisheries v. R,77 while calling goodwill property, goes some way
toward revealing the distinctively equitable nature and structure of goodwill.
Manitoba Fisheries, the appellant in the case, operated a freshwater fish
import-export business with an established customer base.78  The govern-
ment passed legislation creating a Crown Corporation with a monopoly on
the sale of freshwater fish.79  The same customers who before the legislation
had bought their fish from the plaintiff after the legislation were rerouted to
the Crown Corporation.80  Although Manitoba Fisheries clearly lacked a
property right in the customers themselves, the court recognized that it had
something else: a right to the flow of custom through the established channel
of its goodwill.81  The government’s taking of goodwill was in effect the diver-
sion of this flow of custom to its own Crown Corporation.82  The “taking” in
73 Inland Revenue Comm’rs v. Muller & Co.’s Margarine, Ltd. [1901] AC 217 (HL)
224 (Eng.) (Lord Macnaghten).
74 Robertson v. Quiddington (1860) 54 ER 469, 471 (Eng.).
75 See Rowe v. Toon, 169 N.W. 38 (Iowa 1918), where the sale of a physician’s practice
was deemed possible despite the fact that no tangible thing accompanied the transfer.
76 See Marketable “Goodwill”—The Assignability in Gross of A Foreign Name, 35 YALE L.J.
496, 499–500 (1926); see also An Inquiry into the Nature of Goodwill, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 660,
673 (1953).
77 Manitoba Fisheries Ltd. v. R, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 101 (Can.).
78 Id. at 103.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 104.
81 Id. at 108.
82 Id. at 118.  This decision involved an application of the ancient equitable presump-
tion of just compensation for takings of both legal and equitable rights, which in common-
law jurisdictions was applied to ensure proper state-citizen relations in the enactment of
legislation.  For an account of the role of equity in the context of public, administrative
decisionmaking more generally, see Timothy Endicott, Equity and Administrative Behavior: A
Commentary, in EQUITY AND ADMINISTRATION 367 (P.G. Turner ed., 2016).
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this case that required compensation was not the taking of what the appellant
already had but what it had coming to it: the flow of custom through pro-
tected channels.  The equitable underpinnings of the right are made explicit
in the decision.  Justice Ritchie wrote, “I think it to be only fair and equitable
that this loss [of goodwill] should be reflected in the amount of compensa-
tion awarded to the appellant [for a taking].”83
Private appropriation of goodwill similarly involves a diversion or
obstruction of the channel for the flow of value—a distinctively equitable
interest—and not the appropriation of a thing or of value already existing in
some fixed form.84  This is the point, I take it, of a case like Ciba-Geigy Canada
Ltd. v. Apotex Inc., a Supreme Court of Canada case that linked recovery for
the tort of passing off to a demonstration that the name allegedly misappro-
priated attracted goodwill.85  Goodwill in that context, as in Manitoba Fisher-
ies, was understood as “the reputation and drawing power of a given business
in its market.”86  Thus, what is protected is not a right to a thing, a name, but
an interest in a protected channel (and so the name as the anchor of good-
will, the channel through which value flows).  In British Telecommunications Plc
v. One in a Million Ltd.,87 the English Court of Appeal explained passing off
actions in terms of this distinctively equitable form of “property” in goodwill
(note in what follows the court’s hesitation in calling this property at all):
There appears to be considerable diversity of opinion as to the nature
of the right, the invasion of which is the subject of what are known as pass-
ing-off actions.  The more general opinion appears to be that the right is a
right of property.  This view naturally demands an answer to the question—
property in what?  Some authorities say property in the mark, name, or get-
up improperly used by the defendant.  Others say, property in the business
or goodwill likely to be injured by the misrepresentation. . . . [I]f the right
invaded is a right of property at all, there are, I think, strong reasons for
preferring the latter view.88
The defendants in that case had registered websites consisting in the
plaintiffs’ trading names (e.g., virgin.org., britishtelecom.co.uk). The regis-
tration of the domain names amounted to a takeover of a protected channel
for the flow of custom, with the threat of diverting that flow to another if the
plaintiffs did not pay up. The court recognized that the purpose of the regis-
tration was
83 Manitoba Fisheries Ltd., [1979] 1 S.C.R. at 118.
84 See, for example, Law Society of B.C. v. Canadian Domain Name Exchange Corp., 2005
BCCA 535 (Can.), where a permanent injunction was granted against a party that had
registered “lsbc.ca” and “lawsocietybc.ca” prohibiting its continued uses of those domains.
The Law Society of British Columbia successfully argued that the use of websites similar to
its own amounted to an appropriation of its goodwill. Id. para. 2.
85 Ciba-Geigy Can. Ltd. v. Apotex Inc., [1992] 3 S.C.R. 120, 132 (Can.).
86 Id. at 134.
87 [1999] ETMR (Civ) 61 (Eng.).
88 Id. at 76 (citation omitted).
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to extract money from the owners of the goodwill in the name chosen.  Its
ability to do so was in the main dependent upon the threat, expressed or
implied, that the appellants would exploit the goodwill by either trading
under the name or equipping another with the name so he could do so.89
The injunction in that case protected the plaintiffs’ goodwill so as to prevent
others from diverting or obstructing what the plaintiff, from an equitable
standpoint had coming to them: the flow of custom that tradename attracted.
VII. MUTUAL (AND JOINT) WILLS
In a mutual or joint will,90 each party makes a will on identical terms,
leaving his or her estate to the survivor for life, remainder to a designated
beneficiary.91 “For instance, A makes his will giving a life interest to B, should
B survive A, remainder to C absolutely.  B then makes his will giving a life
interest to A, should A survive B, remainder to C absolutely.”92 C is intended
here to be the ultimate beneficiary of A and B’s estates; the survivor of A and
B have the other’s estate until the survivor’s own death.  Assume that A dies
before B, and B then alters the terms of his will, directing the remainder to
someone other than C.  The problem is plain: as one treatise writer put it,
“[t]here is now no one who can sue on the contract; the deceased party has
suffered no loss, and the third party beneficiary of the agreement is not a
party to the contract.”93  In the mutual wills cases, the agreement presup-
poses the fact that one party will die before the other and will not be in a
position to assert contractual rights to secure the third party’s benefit.  To
resolve this problem, courts have been willing to impose a constructive trust
in favor of C.94  In doing this, equity achieves a result that the law alone
cannot achieve: a specifically enforceable duty on the part of survivor to for-
bear from exercising her legal powers with respect to her own property, for
the benefit of C.  Equity, in doing so, creates an interest on the part of C in
the subject matter of A and B’s agreement.  This, too, is an instance of equity
protecting what we have coming to us; here, equity is concerned to prevent
an inequitable diversion of the subject matter of the agreement between A
89 Id. at 68.  Appeal to the House of Lords was denied.
90 In a mutual will, in contrast to a joint will, each party executes a separate testamen-
tary document on identical terms.
91 It should be noted that much of the trouble in these cases is caused by evidentiary
uncertainty as to whether a binding agreement was made or not, an issue largely outside
the scope of this discussion. See id. at 544–47.
92 WATERS, supra note 58, at 542.
93 Id. at 543.
94 See Bee v. Smith, 86 Cal. Rptr. 115 (Ct. App. 1970).  Other courts have arrived at the
same result through slightly different equitable means, finding that the agreement con-
cerning the mutual wills is irrevocable and warrants specific performance. See, e.g., Pyle by
Straub v. United States, 766 F.2d 1141 (7th Cir. 1985); Portmann v Herard, 409 P.3d 1199
(Wash. App. Div. 2 2018); In re Estate of Richardson, 525 P.2d 816 (Wash. App. Div. 3
1979).
42855 ndl_96-3 Sheet N
o. 116 Side A      01/21/2021   10:02:26
42855 ndl_96-3 Sheet No. 116 Side A      01/21/2021   10:02:26
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-3\NDL305.txt unknown Seq: 25 12-JAN-21 7:09
2021] equitable  remedies 1139
and B, to which C had no legal right but which, according to that agreement
she had coming to her.
The specifically performable duty of a survivor in B’s position is equity’s
response to the injustice of diverting what someone in C’s position has com-
ing to her.  Consider the case of Dufour v. Pereira,95 a prominent case fol-
lowed by the SCC some 200 years later in Pratt v. Johnson.96  In Dufour, a
married couple made a joint will and there was evidence that they had
agreed not to alter the will.  The will gave a life estate to the survivor of the
husband and wife, remainder to certain beneficiaries.  After the husband’s
death, the wife made a new will that was a departure from the joint will that
she and her husband had agreed to maintain.  The beneficiaries of the joint
will sought to impose a trust on her estate in their favor.  Lord Camden
wrote: “It is a contract between the parties, which cannot be rescinded, but by
the consent of both.  The first that dies, carries his part of the contract into
execution.  Will the Court afterwards permit the other to break the contract?
Certainly not.”97
In Pratt v. Johnson, husband and wife made a joint will providing that
their respective estates should be held by the survivor “during his or her life
to use as such survivor may see fit,”98 and upon the death of the survivor the
remaining property was to be divided equally among five named benefi-
ciaries.  After the husband’s death, the wife made a will by which bequests
were made to three beneficiaries in addition to the five beneficiaries named
in the joint will.  Citing Dufour, Justice Locke held for the majority that, due
to the agreement between the husband and the wife, a trust was fastened
upon the property in favor of the five named beneficiaries at the moment
that the husband died.99  Snell’s Equity was cited for the following proposi-
tion: “Until the death of the first to die either may withdraw from the
arrangement, but thereafter it is irrevocable, at least if the survivor accepts
the benefits conferred on him by the other’s will.”100
What justifies the trust in these cases?101  One explanation is that, like in
Moore v. Sweet and Tulk, the agreement to make a mutual will is specifically
enforceable, which is just to say (on my account) that equity will protect C’s
95 1 Dick. 419 (1769); Pratt v. Johnson, [1959] S.C.R. 102 (Can.).
96 Pratt, [1959] S.C.R. 102.
97 Dufour, 1 Dick. at 421 (cited in Pratt, [1959] S.C.R.at 110).
98 Pratt, [1959] S.C.R. at 102.
99 Id. at 106.
100 Id. at 109 (quoting EDMUND HENRY TURNER SNELL, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 156 (R.V.
Megarry & P.V. Baker eds., 24th ed. 1954)).  Note that there is some disagreement as to the
point in time at which the trust comes into existence, and whether or not the survivor’s
acceptance of some benefit is a precondition to the existence of the trust.  It has since been
held that a party to a mutual will agreement need not receive a benefit to be bound by the
agreement.  Univ. of Manitoba v. Sanderson Est., (1998) CarswellBC 121 (Can.) (WL).
101 See WATERS, supra note 58, at 554–57.  The prevention of fraud is a commonly stated
justification, and there is an analogy to Rochefoucauld v. Boustead [1897] 1 Ch. 196 (Eng.).
See also OOSTERHOFF ET AL., supra note 51, at 857 (explaining the trust as perfecting inten-
tions and preventing detrimental reliance).
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interest in what she has coming to her precisely because contract law on its
own is not up to the task.102 C has an equitable interest in the subject matter
of the contract between A and B—the property meant to devolve according
to the terms of the joint will—protected in the form of a trust: it is an equita-
ble obligation that constrains the survivor’s power to divert the property by
leaving it to someone else under a later will.  This is not, of course, an express
trust, which would require an intention on the part of A and B actually to
create a trust for C, but a remedial (constructive) trust.103  As the contract
scholar Donovan Waters put it:
It is essentially this contract which the courts are enforcing; the constructive
trust is employed as a means of securing from the surviving promisor a spe-
cific relief for the petitioning third party, a relief which is akin in its result to
the specific performance that the promisee might have had against that
promisor.104
In doing this, equity makes a rare departure from the rule that a will only
takes effect upon the death of the testator. B would otherwise be free to alter
his will until his own death.  But C’s equitable interest in the contract
between A and B puts fetters on B’s exercise of this power.  Equity’s mandate
is to insulate the channel of value from unconscionable intrusion during this
period, before C’s legal right crystallizes.
VIII. INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTION
An account of equitable remedies as protecting what we have coming to
us against diversion or obstruction makes sense of  injunctions in a wide
102 An important similarity between Moore v. Sweet and the mutual wills cases might be
that, in both cases, one of the contracting parties has fully performed her end of the bar-
gain.  In other words, one party has fully complied with what our system of private law
required.  On this point, Waters writes:
The doctrine concerning agreements to make joint and mutual wills, the secret
trust doctrine, and the Rochefoucauld v. Boustead doctrine may have this in com-
mon that in each case Equity compels the person, who has given an undertaking,
to carry out that undertaking if the other party has performed his part.
WATERS, supra note 58, at 555.  Performance by the one encourages the view that equity
takes of a third-party beneficiary’s right. But see Fraser River Pile & Dredge Ltd. v. Can-Dive
Servs. Ltd., [1999] 3 S.C.R. 108, 109 (Can.).  The SCC has allowed C the benefit conferred
by a contract between A and B, but only where that benefit is asserted as a shield to defend
against a claim brought by A or B, not an independent cause of action.
103 Re Schebsman, [1944] Ch. 83, in OOSTERHOFF ET AL., supra note 51.  In Lloyd’s v.
Harper (1880) 16 Ch. 290 (Eng.), the court was willing to find that a contract between A
and B for the benefit of C made A a trustee of B’s promise to perform, allowing the third
party to sue in equity for performance.
104 WATERS, supra note 58, at 555.  Later, it is suggested that, given that the “flexible
and multi-causal nature of the constructive trust is now established in common law
Canada,” it can “forthrightly be said that the remedy takes the form of bringing about
performance of the agreement that was entered into by the parties.” Id. at 557.  I agree on
the idea of specific performance grounding the constructive trust but disagree on the
nature of specific performance.
42855 ndl_96-3 Sheet N
o. 117 Side A      01/21/2021   10:02:26
42855 ndl_96-3 Sheet No. 117 Side A      01/21/2021   10:02:26
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-3\NDL305.txt unknown Seq: 27 12-JAN-21 7:09
2021] equitable  remedies 1141
range of circumstances.  There is a consistency to the core nature of the
underlying equitable right that is recognized and protected wherever equita-
ble remedies are deployed: injunctions, generally, enforce a specifically per-
formable equitable duty not to obstruct or divert what another has coming to
her.
While I have focused up until now on equitable remedies as the outcome
of judicial proceedings, equity’s intervention during the judicial process is
also consistent with the approach I have outlined here.  As one mid-twentieth
century writer put it, “[t]heoretically, justice would be best served if adjudica-
tion could take place immediately upon the birth of a controversy.”105  That
adjudication is a temporally extended process that leads to a gap between
what the plaintiff already has, i.e., her cause of action, and what she has com-
ing to her, i.e., the remedy that repairs the wrong complained of.  It is true
even of the plaintiff almost certain to win her case that the ultimate outcome
of the legal proceeding (the final remedy) is not yet hers until adjudication is
complete.  In this temporal gap, there is an opportunity for a defendant to
obstruct or divert the remedy that the cause of action attracts.  Interlocutory
injunctions are distinctively equitable “anticipatory remedies”: they protect
what a plaintiff has coming to her through a legal proceeding, begun106 but
as yet incomplete, by imposing specifically performable, temporary duties on
the defendant.107  These equitable duties have the effect of maintaining the
position the plaintiff would be in if adjudication were instantaneous (such
that the remedy coming to her is already hers).  In some contexts this means
preventing a defendant from doing something that would change the status
quo (a prohibitive injunction); in other contexts this means requiring a
defendant to do something to maintain the status quo at the outset of the
process (the less common mandatory  injunction).108  Equitable intervention
105 Note, Interlocutory Injunctions and the Injunction Bond, 73 HARV. L. REV. 331, 336
(1959).
106 Intriguingly, the process need not be before the court issuing the injunction; in
Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees Canadian Pacific System
Federation, the Court held that an injunction is available “where there is a justiciable right,
wherever that right may fall to be determined.”  [1996] 2 S.C.R. 495, para. 16 (Can.).  In
other words, a court is free to issue an injunction so long as there is a legal right to be
ascertained through a legal process, regardless of the forum in which that process takes
place.
107 SMITH, supra note 6, at 20.
108 The principal difference, for the purposes of a tribunal determining whether to
grant an injunction, is the strength of the underlying claim.  The first stage of the test for a
mandatory injunction is that there is “a strong prima facie case,” amounting to a demonstra-
tion that there is a “strong likelihood on the law and the evidence presented” that the appli-
cation will “be ultimately successful” at trial. See R v. Canadian Broad. Corp., 2018 SCC 5,
[2018] 1 S.C.R. 196, paras. 15, 17 (Can.); see also Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d 307, 319 (4th
Cir. 2013) (holding that “when the preliminary injunction is ‘mandatory rather than pro-
hibitory in nature,’ this Court’s ‘application of this exacting standard of review is even
more searching’” (quoting In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 333 F.3d 517, 525 (4th
Cir. 2003), abrogated on other grounds by eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388
(2006))); Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York, 435 F.3d 78, 89 (2d Cir. 2006) (“In distin-
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in the form of an interlocutory injunction reflects equity’s view that a plaintiff
has an interest in the future remedy—the plaintiff’s case is such that equity
can see that remedy as coming to her.  In a typical common-law jurisdiction,
therefore, a party seeking the injunction must prove that she has a strong
prima facie case.109  At minimum, this requires showing that there is a “seri-
ous question to be tried”110 and that there is a “real prospect of suc-
ceeding.”111  U.S. courts have required that the plaintiff seeking a
preliminary injunction establish that “he is likely to succeed on the mer-
its.”112  The appropriateness of an interlocutory injunction is tightly bound
to the view that a plaintiff’s cause of action actually stands to attract a
remedy.113
The relationship between the equitable interest underlying injunctions
and the legal right that grounded equity’s view of what a person had coming
to her is evident in the Supreme Court of Canada case, R v. Canadian Broad-
cast Corporation (CBC).114  In that case, the defendant had reported on a first-
degree murder case, naming the victim.  The Crown subsequently sought a
guishing between prohibitory and mandatory injunctions, we have noted that ‘[t]he typical
preliminary injunction is prohibitory and generally seeks only to maintain the status quo
pending a trial on the merits.  A mandatory injunction, in contrast, is said to alter the
status quo by commanding some positive act . . . [and] thus alters the traditional formula by
requiring that the movant demonstrate a greater likelihood of success.’” (alteration in
original) (quoting Tom Doherty Assocs., Inc. v. Saban Ent., Inc., 60 F.3d 27, 34 (2d Cir.
1995))).
109 See JEFFREY BERRYMAN, THE LAW OF EQUITABLE REMEDIES 32 (2d ed. 2013).
110 Id. at 33 (quoting Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd. [1975] AC 396 (HL) 407
(appeal taken from Eng.)).
111 Id. (quoting Am. Cyanamid [1975] AC 396 at 408).  This is true across common-law
jurisdictions.  The test for injunctive relief in Canada, for instance, was most recently
articulated by the Supreme Court in R v. Canadian Broad. Corp., 2018 SCC 5, [2018] 1
S.C.R. 196, where the court affirmed the test developed in RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada
(Att’y Gen.), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 (Can.).  An interlocutory injunction requires the party
applying for the injunction (i) to prove there is a serious question to be tried in the sense
that the application is neither frivolous nor vexatious; (ii) to demonstrate that there will be
“irreparable harm” if the application is refused; and (iii) to show that the balance of conve-
nience, taking into account the effect of the injunction on the parties, favors a grant of the
injunction. Canadian Broad. Corp., 2018 SCC 5, para. 12.
112 Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); see also Glossip v. Gross,
576 U.S. 863, 876 (2015); BOKF, NA v. Estes, 923 F.3d 558, 561–62 (9th Cir. 2019).  Other
requirements are: he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary
relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public
interest.
113 Equity’s intervention in anticipation of the plaintiff’s success depends on the mitiga-
tion of harm to a defendant should it turn out that the court awarded the injunction
erroneously.  In addition to assessing the strength of the plaintiff’s case upfront, there are
mechanisms that equity can deploy to avoid harm to a defendant in cases where the court
misjudged the strength of the plaintiff’s case ex ante.  Plaintiffs may, for instance, be
required to post injunction bonds to secure indemnification of the defendant if it turns
out that the injunction was erroneously granted.
114 2018 SCC 5, [2018] 1 S.C.R. 196 (Can.).
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criminal contempt conviction for the broadcaster’s breach of a publication
ban placed on it, as well as an injunction calling for the identifying informa-
tion in question to be removed until the contempt action was resolved.115
The SCC viewed the Crown’s request for an injunction as improper insofar as
it treated the criminal contempt citation and the injunction as separate mat-
ters.116  The Alberta Court of Appeal had cast the availability of an injunction
as a matter of “whether the Crown has demonstrated a strong prima facie case
entitling it to a mandatory order directing removal of the identifying material
from the website.”117  In articulating the test for interlocutory injunctions in
this way, the court of appeal sought to understand the plaintiff’s claim to an
injunction apart from the legal outcome that (the Crown claimed) was on
the horizon.
The SCC emphasized that a mandatory interlocutory injunction is “a
remedy ancillary to a cause of action,”118 and so its availability is contingent
on the strength of the associated claim in law.119  The mandatory injunction
just is the way to ensure that a contempt case with a high degree of success
would not be gutted of efficacy a priori because the victim’s identity had
already become widely known.  The injunction would only be available had
the Crown made out a strong prima facie case of criminal contempt,120
which the Crown had not in that case.121
This case helpfully illustrates two points.  First, the equitable interlocu-
tory remedy exists to protect the party’s interest in what she has coming to
her following the adjudication of her cause of action: an effective remedy.
Assuming the Crown’s case, an injunction would prevent the dissemination
of the inappropriate information prior to trial; absent such an injunction, the
delay caused by the legal process would make an ultimate suppression of the
identifying information at the time of trial ineffective.  Secondly, R v. CBC
shows that the availability of the injunctive interlocutory remedy is necessarily
tied to the strength of the legal claim at the outset.
115 Id. para. 23.
116 Id. para. 23.
117 Id. para 9.
118 Id. para. 24 (quoting Amchem Prods., Inc. v. British Columbia (Workers’ Comp.
Bd.) [1993] 1 S.C.R. 897, 930 (Can.)).
119 Id. para. 25.
120 The court also suggested that this may not have been sufficient. See id. para. 26 (“It
is implicit in the foregoing analysis that, in some circumstances, an interlocutory injunc-
tion may be sought and issued to enjoin allegedly criminal conduct.  The delineation of
those circumstances, however, I would not decide here.  To be clear, the disposition of this
appeal should not be taken as standing for the proposition that injunctive relief is ordina-
rily or readily available in criminal matters, or that—even had the Crown been able to show
in this case a strong prima facie case of criminal contempt—an injunction would have been
available.”).
121 Id. para. 31.
42855 ndl_96-3 Sheet N
o. 118 Side B      01/21/2021   10:02:26
42855 ndl_96-3 Sheet No. 118 Side B      01/21/2021   10:02:26
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-3\NDL305.txt unknown Seq: 30 12-JAN-21 7:09
1144 notre dame law review [vol. 96:3
A Mareva injunction is a well-known form of interlocutory injunction in
common-law jurisdictions.122  A Mareva injunction is an in personam order,
generally granted ex parte, requiring that a party neither deal with nor
remove assets (equivalent to the value of the applicant’s claim) from the
jurisdiction.  As assets have become increasingly mobile and thus more read-
ily removed from the courts’ jurisdiction, Mareva injunctions, initially devel-
oped in the context of the English shipping industry, have been used across a
wide range of disputes.123
The prejudgment restraint on the disposition of assets pending trial is
an extraordinary form of equitable relief, imposing potentially significant
costs on the defendant.  Accordingly, an application for a Mareva injunction
is demanding; it requires (i) a full and frank disclosure of all matters in the
applicant’s knowledge that are material, (ii) a statement of the particulars of
the claim against the defendant, including the amount of the claim, fairly
stating the points against the defendant, (iii) the grounds for believing that
there is a risk of assets being removed from the court’s jurisdiction prior to
the judgment or award being satisfied, (iv) an undertaking in damages, in
the event the claim fails or the injunction is unjustified, and (v) grounds for
believing that the defendant has assets in the jurisdiction at the time of the
application.124  Although a Mareva injunction is itself prohibitive, not
mandatory, the applicant nevertheless has to prove that there is a “strong
prima facie case” for the underlying claim.125
In the context of Mareva injunctions, as with interlocutory injunctions
generally, equity conceives of the value of the ultimate legal remedy as some-
thing a person has coming to her—given its view of the strength of her legal
claim.  Equity intervenes to protect the potential value that adheres in a
122 Mareva Compania Naviera SA v. Int’l Bulkcarriers SA [1980] All ER 213 (Eng.);
ROBERT J. SHARPE, INJUNCTIONS AND SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, ¶ 2.700 (4th ed. 2017).
123 In Canada, the Supreme Court first recognized Mareva injunctions in Aetna Finan-
cial Services Ltd. v. Feigelman, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 2 (Can.), a bankruptcy dispute.  However,
lower courts had made use of Mareva injunctions for years prior to this. See, e.g., Parmar
Fisheries Ltd. v. Parceria Maritima Esperanca L. DA. (1982), 53 N.S.R. 2d 338 (Can. Nov.
Scot.); Liberty Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. v. Atkin (1981), 31 O.R. 2d 715 (Can. Ont.).  In the
United States, Mareva injunctions have not flourished as they have in Canada and else-
where.  A narrow 5–4 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo,
S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 332–33 (1999), held that federal courts do not
have equitable jurisdiction to issue Mareva injunctions because such injunctions were not
available at the time the 1789 Judiciary Act was enacted. See also Karaha Bodas Co. v.
Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 500 F.3d 111, 117 n.8 (2d Cir.
2007); SEC v Cavanagh, 445 F.3d 105, 117 n.27, 118 n.28 (2d Cir. 2006); Velasquez v.
Metro Fuel Oil Corp., No. 12 CV1548(NGG) (LB), 2012 WL 5879446, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Oct.
25, 2012).  For criticism of the majority approach in Grupo Mexicano, see Samuel L. Bray,
The Supreme Court and the New Equity, 68 VAND. L. REV. 997, 1009–14 (2015), and David
Capper, The Need for Mareva Injunctions Reconsidered, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2161, 2174
(2005).
124 See SHARPE, supra note 122, ¶¶ 2.850–2.950.
125 Aetna, [1985] 1 S.C.R. at 10 (quoting Chitel v. Rothbart (1982), 39 O.R. 2d 513, 522
(Can. Ont. C.A.)) (emphasis omitted).
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claim, value that ought to flow through the established channel of the judi-
cial process, by imposing specifically performable duties on the defendant.  A
defendant is prevented from removing her assets so as to divert or destroy the
value of a future judgment in her favor.126
Equity has a related role to play after judicial proceedings are complete,
but before judgments are enforced.  In the nineteenth century, courts in
common-law jurisdictions used equitable powers to “fill the gap” between the
issuance of a judgment and the judgment-creditor’s enforcement.  In Cum-
mins v. Perkins,127 a plaintiff was directed to pay the defendants’ costs after a
failed negligence action; the plaintiff, a married woman, was ordered to pay
out of her separate estate—which consisted of just one share to which she
was entitled under a will.128  The defendants, fearing they would lose the
benefit of the judgment, applied for a receiver to be appointed for the
share.129  At the Chancery Court, the plaintiff’s counsel argued that such an
order should not be granted; it would amount to “equitable execution, but,
according to established practice, to entitled [the defendants] to equitable
execution they must be in a position to get legal execution.”130  Judge
Kekewich rejected this position, notwithstanding that “equitable enforce-
ment” was apparently “entirely without precedent and the established rules
of the Court.”131  Lindley MR, at the court of appeal, affirmed.  The equita-
ble powers of the court allowed it to intervene to protect the value that would
flow to the defendants, notwithstanding that their right to a particular source
of that value has not yet crystalized.  Equitable “enforcement” of this sort
can be seen in other actions aimed at the preservation of assets, such as a
postjudgment injunction to restrain assets while quantum is assessed132 or
pending appeal,133 or where a party seeks to have a foreign judgment recog-
nized in Canada.134
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that there is a class of remedies—equitable rem-
edies—that go beyond the enforcement of our property rights, which con-
cern only what we already have, and our contractual rights, which concern
only a person’s right to another’s performance as agreed.  These equitable
remedies, on this account, stand as the recognition and protection of a dis-
126 Cummins v. Perkins [1897] 1 Ch. 16 (Eng.).
127 Id.
128 Id. at 16–17.
129 Id. at 17.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 18.
132 See, e.g., Lamont v. Kent (1999), 30 CPC 4th 168 (Ont. Gen. Div.); Orwell Steel
(Erection and Fabrication) Ltd. v. Asphalt & Tarmac (U.K.) Ltd., [1984] 1 WLR 1097 (QB)
at 1097.
133 Walter E. Heller Fin. Corp. v. Am. Gen. Supply of Can. (1969) Ltd., [1986] 30
D.L.R. 4th 600, 609 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
134 See, e.g., Hunt v. BP Expl. Co. (Libya) [1980] 1 NZLR 104 (N.Z.).
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tinct equitable right to the unobstructed flow of what a person has coming to
her, as a party to a contract, as a competitor in a free market, as a neighbor,
as a party to a lawsuit, and more.  Equity intervenes in the form of “a negotia-
ble duty” that constrains whoever now has the power to compromise that
interest through obstructing or diverting its flow.  This negotiable duty trav-
els to whoever bears the power to compromise the equitable interest.  A spe-
cifically performable contract, on this approach, is thus a composite of two
distinct rights: the contractual right to performance and an equitable right
that extends beyond the contractual right.  Breaking out of the confines of
privity, the equitable right is enforceable against whoever bears the power to
compromise the protected interest with notice of it.  One important implica-
tion of this account is that the equitable interests and duties that arise in
conjunction with specific performance need not and often do not track what
the parties actually agreed upon.
The need for equity to recognize and to protect our interest in “what we
have coming to us” is at the same time a recognition of a gap between what
contract law in particular, and private law generally, aims at—viz., to bring
about a planned-for state of affairs—and what contract law in particular, and
private law generally actually does, viz., merely to obligate private actors to
exercise other independent powers they have to bring about that state of
affairs.  While an agreement to sell property obligates a vendor to exercise
her power to convey property, the agreement is not in itself an exercise of
that power to convey.  It falls to equity to perfect private law, by preventing
others from compromising our interest in what we have coming to us, while it
is en route.
